By Zerihun Hailu
Over the past five years, Ethiopia has experienced continuous instability—from the devastating war in Tigray to ongoing conflicts in Amhara and Oromia. These overlapping crises have left the country fragile, with tensions that remain unresolved. At the same time, Eritrea, under the leadership of Isaias Afwerki, has maintained an active role in regional conflicts, including in Sudan and Ethiopia. While it faces no war within its borders, its political and military influence continues to extend beyond them, shaping the trajectory of conflicts across the region.
Isaias Afwerki’s regional behaviour is defined by strategic flexibility—aligning with different actors at different times to maintain influence. This pattern has been evident across multiple conflicts, including in Yemen and Ethiopia.
During the war in Tigray, Eritrea’s regime was a central military ally of the Ethiopian federal government in its fight against the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). Its forces played a significant role on the ground and were widely accused—by international organisations, human rights groups, and Ethiopian authorities—of committing serious violations, including civilian killings, widespread destruction, and abuses against civilians. The Ethiopian federal government itself publicly acknowledged Eritrean military involvement during the war.
However, the post-war period has revealed a notable shift. Increasing reports from Tigray-based analysts and political observers indicate direct engagement between Eritrean officials and the TPLF faction, including security and political consultations. These accounts describe instances in which Eritrean leaders have travelled to Mekelle while the leaders of the TPLF faction have engaged counterparts in Asmara.
Beyond these direct contacts, Eritrea’s influence is increasingly visible within Tigray’s internal political dynamics. Analysts and local observers have repeatedly pointed to its role in shaping political narratives and alignments. Pro-Eritrean messaging has also appeared across social media networks, often targeting the Tigray Interim Administration and figures perceived as aligned with the federal government.
This evolution—from a wartime military ally of the federal government to an active political actor engaging with the TPLF faction—highlights Eritrea’s broader strategic approach: maintaining influence regardless of shifting alliances.
Ultimately, Eritrea’s regime has consistently demonstrated that it is more reliable as a wartime ally than as a partner for peace and development. Its regional posture prioritises strategic leverage through conflict rather than long-term stability. As such, its growing involvement in Tigray’s political landscape represents not a pathway to peace, but a potential driver of renewed instability.
The Pretoria Peace Agreement brought an end to active hostilities and formally excluded Eritrea from the peace process. However, this exclusion did not eliminate Eritrea’s influence. Instead, post-agreement dynamics suggest a reconfiguration. Eritrea appears to be re-engaging through informal and indirect channels, particularly with factions inside the TPLF. This shift reflects a strategic recalculation: moving from overt military involvement to more subtle political and security engagement. In practice, this shift has translated into increasing Eritrean involvement in Tigray’s political landscape, raising concerns about external influence in a fragile post-conflict environment.
The recent war in Tigray illustrates how political rivalry among elites can escalate into a devastating war. What began as a political transition in 2018 quickly deteriorated into mutual distrust, as both sides prioritised power consolidation and political survival over compromise and dialogue. By 2020, this breakdown in trust had turned into full-scale war, despite the absence of a fundamental ideological divide that could not have been negotiated.
The consequences were catastrophic, including mass civilian suffering, large-scale displacement, and long-term institutional fragmentation. Although the Pretoria Agreement ended active fighting, underlying mistrust and unresolved political grievances remain. This pattern of ego-driven political competition continues to shape Ethiopia’s instability today, feeding both internal divisions within the TPLF and broader regional entanglements that heighten the risk of renewed conflict.
To this day, some senior political and military figures within the TPLF remain reluctant to engage directly with the federal government, while also criticising those who advocate for such engagement. This reluctance limits opportunities for constructive dialogue and delays practical solutions for the people of Tigray, whose needs require cooperation with any actor capable of delivering stability and services. If this cycle of political rivalry continues, it risks contributing to yet another catastrophic war.
TPLF decisions fuel escalating dangers
Recent decisions by the TPLF have heightened tensions. In a meeting held in Axum, the organisation announced the reinstatement of the pre-war Tigray Regional Council and called for the restructuring of the interim administration, citing deteriorating conditions and slow implementation of the Pretoria Agreement.
These actions directly challenge the post-war political framework. Lt. Gen. Tadesse Worede, president of the Tigray Interim Administration, warned that such decisions violate the Pretoria Agreement and risk undermining stabilisation efforts. The situation becomes more concerning when viewed alongside reported Eritrean engagement with the TPLF faction, which may embolden hardline positions and increase the likelihood of confrontation with the federal government.
Within some TPLF circles and among their supporters, a concerning perception has taken hold: that engagement with Asmara offers a more effective path than cooperation with Addis Ababa. Those advocating collaboration with the Ethiopian federal government are often labelled as disloyal, while alignment with Eritrea is framed as strategic. However, this reflects a fundamental miscalculation.
Under the leadership of Isaias, Eritrea has consistently demonstrated that it is more reliable as a wartime ally than as a partner for peace and development. Its regional posture prioritises strategic leverage through conflict rather than long-term stability. As such, expecting Eritrea to act as a trusted partner in rebuilding and stabilising Tigray is unrealistic.
Sustainable peace and recovery in Tigray depend on constructive engagement with Ethiopia’s federal institutions—not external actors whose interests may shift with changing political circumstances.
Federal missteps fuel external influence
While external influence is significant, the Ethiopian federal government has also contributed to the current fragility.
First, the implementation of the Pretoria Agreement has been uneven. Although commitments have been made to restore essential services, gaps in delivery have created frustration and allowed competing narratives to gain traction.
Second, border management between Ethiopia and Eritrea has been insufficiently controlled. The reopening of crossings has enabled increased movement of political and security actors, including those linked to Eritrean authorities and the TPLF faction. Informal initiatives such as “Tsimdo” people-to-people engagement may further facilitate interaction outside formal oversight.
Additionally, the federal government has at times publicly accused Eritrea of destabilising activities, underscoring the seriousness of the issue. However, these concerns have not always been matched by consistent and effective policy responses.
If the federal government fails to properly manage the evolving relationship between Eritrea and the TPLF faction, the consequences could be severe. In the event of renewed conflict, a coordinated or overlapping alignment between Eritrean forces and the TPLF faction would pose a significant and dangerous challenge to Ethiopia’s national security.
Finally, strategic focus remains a concern. Engagement with non-critical domestic controversies risks diverting attention from urgent priorities such as border control, political stabilisation, and preventing external interference.
Conclusion
Ethiopia stands at a critical moment. The convergence of Eritrea’s active involvement, the TPLF’s political decisions, and gaps in federal response creates a volatile environment with the potential for renewed conflict.
The warning signs are clear: external influence is growing, internal divisions are deepening, and the post-war framework is under strain.
Preventing another war will require decisive and coordinated action—strengthening the implementation of the Pretoria Agreement, reinforcing governance in Tigray, tightening border controls, and limiting external interference.
Above all, it requires a clear understanding of regional realities. Eritrea, under the leadership of Isaias, is unlikely to function as a trusted long-term partner for peace; its role has consistently aligned more closely with wartime strategy than post-conflict reconstruction.
Without a shift in approach, the risk is clear: political miscalculations and unmanaged alliances could once again push Ethiopia toward a conflict whose cost will ultimately be borne by its people.
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Editor’s Note: Zerihun Hailu is a junior researcher and geopolitical analyst with a focus on the Horn of Africa and the Sahel region. He can be reached at [email protected]
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